

Location: via Teams

Meeting ID: 245 443 935 94 **Passcode:** tKAuFM

Committee Members: (12 members, 7 = quorum)

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|---|--|---|---|
| x | Linneth Riley-Hall, Transit, Co-Chair/Tony Raben | x | Tom Zamzow, Walsh Construction, Co-Chair |
| | Bob Armstead, NAMC MBE | x | Santosh Kuruvilla, Engineers |
| x | Lekha Fernandes, OMWBE/Sharon Harvey Hughes, OMWBE | x | Stuart Moore, Atkinson Construction |
| | Bobby Forch, MSVBE | x | Jessica Murphy, City of Seattle |
| x | Metin Keles, WBE/ Arthur Antoine, Axium | | John Salinas II, Specialty Subcontractors |
| x | Joseph C. Kline, WSU | x | Robynne Thaxton, Private Industry |

Guests/Stakeholders:

- | | | | |
|---|--|---|--|
| x | Talia Baker, DES/CPARB Staff | x | Keith Molenaar, UC, Boulder |
| x | Melanie Baldwin, WSDOT | x | Nathan Monroe, Contractor |
| x | Thomas Brasch, WSDOT | x | Geoff Owen, Kiewit |
| x | Nancy Deakins, DES | x | Tony Raben, Sound Transit |
| x | Doug Gransberg, Gransberg & Associates, Inc. | x | Ken Regan, Contractor |
| x | Thrall Hershberger, Kraemer | x | Olivia Yang, WSU |
| x | Jessica Letteney, MFA | x | Janice Zahn, CPARB Chair and Ports Rep |
| x | Art McCluskey, WSDOT | | |

The meeting began at 3:05 p.m.

Call to Order and Roll Call for Quorum

A roll call of members confirmed the meeting quorum. Co-Chair Tom Zamzow welcomed everyone to the Capital Projects Advisory Review Board (CPARB) WSDOT Project Delivery Method Review Task Force (TF).

Approve Agenda

Co-Chair Zamzow reviewed the agenda, suggested an adjustment to the time to review the next meeting's agenda, and requested any additional suggested changes; none were forthcoming.

Robynne Thaxton moved to approve the agenda, and Santosh Kuruvilla seconded the motion. The agenda was approved by a unanimous voice vote.

Approve Minutes from 09/04/2024 Meeting

Co-Chair Zamzow requested discussion or edits from the group on the minutes from the 9/04/2024 meeting; none were forthcoming.

Jessica Murphy moved to approve the minutes of the September 4, 2024, meeting, and Robynne Thaxton seconded the motion. The motion to approve the minutes was approved by a unanimous voice vote.

Presentation and Discussion with Doug Gransberg and Keith Molenaar

Keith Molenaar, PhD, Dean of the College of Engineering and Applied Sciences at the University of Colorado, Boulder, introduced himself. He did Design-Build (DB) work in the mid-1990s and completed his PhD on DB for the public sector, which wasn't approved by the Federal Highway Administration (FHA) or federal acquisition regulations at the time. The Design-Build Institute of America was just getting off the ground. He has worked in the field for close to 30 years. Today he wants to give the TF some idea about how to look at project performance and project delivery.

Minutes prepared by Jessica Letteney, Maul Foster & Alongi, Inc.

Doug Gransberg, PhD, PE, President of Gransberg & Associates, introduced himself. His first DB project was in 1985 when he was in the Army Corps of Engineers. After that, he spent 20+ years in academia, at Texas Tech, University of Oklahoma, and Iowa State. He did his PhD on the topic of DB. Gransberg & Associates is a consultant heavily involved in alternative delivery. He did a report for the Arkansas Department of Transportation (DOT). He is helping the Oklahoma DOT with its first DB project, which will be Progressive DB. He led the group that wrote the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials guidelines on Construction Manager/General Contractor (CMGC). (He knows the TF uses General Contractor/Construction Manager [GC/CM]). He collaborated on the studies that Keith will show in his presentation. He has consulted on projects for highways, aviation, and transit and is currently working with the Federal Aviation Administration delivering 41 air traffic control towers using DB.

Keith started the presentation, Design-Build Research Summary. He noted that all of the sources are published, and he provided links to them in the presentation, which is posted on the TF website. Slide 3 shows the model for each type of delivery method. Although there is some blurriness out there between methods, he tried to use standardized definitions that show where the contracts flow. The models are oversimplified in the presentation. He will not include Progressive DB; Doug has done seminal work in that area but there wasn't enough data to accurately look at Progressive DB.

For the first study, Revisiting Project Delivery Performance for the Pankow Foundation and Construction Industry Institute (CII), the construction was vertical. For the second, Alternative Contracting Method Performance in U.S. Highway Construction for the FHA, the projects were purely highways, horizontal. The third, ACEC Research Institute Design-Build Study, is a blend of vertical and horizontal.

For the first study in 1998, the CII compared the performance of 351 projects in Design-Bid-Build (DBB), Construction Manager at Risk (CMR) and DB in three areas: cost growth, schedule growth, and delivery speed as square feet per month. It was one of the first studies in the area. DB had lower cost growth and schedule growth was lower. From concept through ribbon-cutting, DB was double the speed of DBB. The Pankow Foundation then asked them to reevaluate those factors after 20 years of technological and organizational changes with a focus on sustainability to answer the question, "Does DB outperform the alternatives?" The researchers found that it does. In the second wave of research, the delivery speed of DB has increased; cost growth came down; and DB is still more reliable than the other methods for cost and schedule. Technical complexity slowed down the delivery speed, but all values stayed the same after 20 years. There are not many opportunities like this to do a two-sided investigation. The findings are solid and reliable. For a bit more detail: The delivery speed of DB increased relative to the other delivery methods, and DB is still more reliable in terms of cost and schedule. On a square-foot basis, DB projects are equivalent or slightly less than the others.

The second study looked at 212 highway projects across the U.S. in a blend of public and privately funded projects constructed between 2008 and 2013. They looked at the top 10% and bottom 10% of performers and tried to find causes behind correlations by doing in-depth interviews with players to find out reasons and lessons learned.

The best-performing projects were marked by (1) a relational project culture—the owners drove success, laid out expectations, and had low tolerance for unfairness or unprofessionalism and (2) repeated relationships for owners, designers, contractors. The market actors learned each other's cultures to drive success.

For the worst-performing projects, (1) lack of experience or training was a big factor, (2) poor communication or unrealistic expectations and delayed decision-making, and (3) turnover in the team, understaffing and no good succession plan drove the results.

The third study, Alternative Contracting Method Performance in U.S. Highway Construction was a report to Congress on alternative contracting methods used in states with DB experience. They looked at contract databases for empirical data for

cost and time, then they conducted interviews and did qualitative surveys. Arthur Antoine was part of the project to validate the data for 291 projects completed between 2004 and 2015. The study includes the largest, traditional projects. They separated the CMGC DB projects into DB low bid (DB-LB) and best value (DB-BV). The study was conducted for projects that occurred during the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), so they had a lot of projects that were shovel-ready, DB-LB projects (which is not common) that performed well.

Co-Chair Zamzow asked whether the projects were selected based on a particular size range.

Keith said that they used all sizes of projects and showed the results by size. They asked states to contribute based on the last projects they had finished as a way to make the study as objective as possible and then they evaluated the data based on size.

Co-Chair Zamzow noted that there was no qualitative score on the low-bid projects.

Keith noted that they were surprised at the number of projects. The study includes a lot of small emergency projects or those that were shovel-ready to receive ARRA funding. These \$2–10 million were one-third of all the projects. The findings do not recommend using DB-LB on complex projects at all.

Co-Chair Zamzow noted that he has seen DB jobs as simple as grind and overlay, which are typically low bid. A different complexity than a project in the downtown area of a big city. He asked whether the study differentiated projects by complexity.

Keith said they have a table of complexity that they asked people to put their projects into. The study looks at size and type of construction. Resurfacing could be expensive, but complexity was if it had interchanges or bridges. They also used it for cost estimating and risk analysis. If interested, Stu Anderson at Texas A&M University used the table of complexity for contingency based on complexity, not just size.

Doug noted that they also used it with Sharp 2 as a way to measure complexity, but it was qualitative not quantitative measurement.

Santosh clarified that low bid was based mostly on quantitative values and best value added a couple of qualitative measures.

Keith confirmed that a couple of projects were as Santosh noted and added that some were based on complex reviews of the design, not just the qualifications.

Doug said that, because these projects included federal funding, they had to use the lowest price technically accessible. And often, with bridges, owners would get someone to draw it up and then make the award to the low bidder.

Keith introduced cost certainty and delivery time. He said they did not expect to see DB being used successfully on so many small projects.

The graphic that shows the timing of awards for DBB and DB-LB for the \$2–10 million projects shows that DB-LB were being delivered before DBB had even begun design—finishing in less than half the time. Some were emergency and some low bid. He noted that, even though he is not a proponent of low-cost technically accessible approach but the \$2–10 million range seems to get really good performance.

For the larger projects in the \$10–50 million range, there were no small CMGC and there were no DB-LB projects. They compared DBB, DB-BV, and GC/CM.

Co-Chair Zamzow asked whether the \$2–10 million projects are in certain parts of the country and states whether the range was broad.

Doug explained that they looked at states that had authorization to require low bid. For example, California requires that half of projects have to be DB-LB. Other states have other anomalies in their legislation that required sealed price proposals and a requirement to award to the lowest bidder even if the agency had a two-step best-value setup. In his opinion, DB-LB is not good unless the agency has already advanced the design. The Department of Defense uses it to obligate money when they've had a delay such as an environmental review, or at the end of year when they need to obligate construction funds, they use DB as a mechanism.

Jessica Murphy said that, for CM/GC (what Washington calls GC/CM) laws are varied in each state. In Washington it is represented as design and construction not overlapping. In Washington, that can be done with the use of MiniMax. She asked whether, in every instance, the design was always finished before the construction began, or whether some projects had overlap.

Keith said that the presentation is showing a simplification; some did have overlap. In this study the key was to define when the cost of the project without change orders is known. In DBB, it's when the agency gets the bid. In DB-BV, there is a phase for requests for qualifications/request for proposals and getting the cost, but the agency doesn't know the cost of CM/GC until the last bid package is out. True cost certainty only occurs when the last bid package is completed, and there could be six packages, depending on how the project is executed.

Even though the chart in the presentation is simple, showing the average dates of the projects, the underlying data is complex. The projects show that CM/GC projects were finishing by the time DB projects were awarded, on average. Federal highway projects require developing time-consuming bulletproof and voluminous two-phase DB projects. They get some competition, but, on average, the CM/GC projects were finishing in about half the time of the DB-BV projects.

Santosh asked whether they knew what percentage of the CM/GC projects were self-performed.

Doug noted that Washington is the only state that has a ceiling on self-proposed, self-performed work. Almost all other states have a minimum for self-performance, and some don't have any restrictions. One finding he would love to discuss is whether the maximum amount for self-performance is reducing competition. If an agency has a heavy highway project, a bridge contractor may want to self-perform at 80% but can only self-perform at 50%. That may cause the contractor to not bid. Half of his company's clients are contractors. He cautions that states may want to be careful and not create restrictions that make them feel so safe that they don't get any bidders because contractors are making no-bid decisions.

Keith said they were surprised at the ability to get into construction earlier and finish earlier, as well as the cost certainty. For competition, there can be multiple ideas in the DB-BV, or have people design knowing that cost is part of the selection, which is a tradeoff. Both methods are better than DBB. With the FHA study, Progressive DB should be able to get these types of results as well, meaning earlier selection and work packages. The very long procurement process seems to be slowing down DB.

Co-Chair Zamzow asked for clarification on whether Keith is saying that the DB-BV is using the CM/GC until the initial agency design is finished, and the little diamond is on the graph is where procurement starts in the DB job. If so, could Keith clarify that what he is calling agency design is really procurement.

Keith noted that the graphic is oversimplified because both the contractor and architectural and engineering firms are on board. He confirmed that this was fixing of the price on the work packages.

Doug noted that the length of DB-BV is a result of trying to maintain DBB milestones, the number of reviews held, and the back and forth with comments. With CM/GC Progressive DB, agencies can settle issues face to face; they don't have to stop the design process. Preparing a 30% or 90% design deliverable and then fooling around for a couple of months for comments is another place where the process slows down. Minnesota DOT uses a technique called over-the-shoulder reviews, which can make the process shorter by getting rid of the review artifacts from DBB. Some agencies don't know how to design if they don't have the 30/60/90 stages.

Stuart Moore noted that DB takes 450 days to design, but at the point of right-of-way (ROW) acquisitions, some 30% design work has been done. In CM/GC, there still is only 450 days. It's a different person but they are still doing the same design. It appears that where the starting point is, some design must have already occurred; the chart appears to be more optimistic than reality.

Keith noted that these are actual projects with data from actual contracts. A lot may have chosen CM/GC on projects that don't have a lot of ROW acquisition. He agrees that an agency would choose a CM/GC or DB method because they are pressed for time. They deliberately made the Gantt chart cartoonish to make their audience think about what those things could be. With a DB-BV request for proposals, there may be four or five firms looking at it as well as protests. When an agency is designing for one contractor or one Design-Builder, the agency is not going through all of that extra work. Ramping up to design so much more quickly makes sense. Also, the factors in the study are averaged over multiple projects.

Doug noted that CM/GC is construction-centric. With the contractor on board, the key issue becomes "how much design is needed to build this." With DBB, and DB-BV to a lesser extent, are design-centric, so the agency doesn't get to start building until they know what they are going to build. Consider the ability to do release for construction packages: people forget that construction includes lining up contractors and getting materials for construction. In CM/GC, however, they can go out and get materials and work around supply chain constraints. Materials can be addressed at any point. DOTs that use CM/GC have a standard package that can procure long-lead-time materials, take care of environmental protection issues so that they don't have to wait for final design and the agency can pay them right up front using that standard package.

Keith said that the study also had a good sample to look at change orders on the projects. The results show the high-performing projects, those with performance in the middle, and some not as strong. For agency-directed contracts, the agency works hand-in-hand with the designer and CM/GC-GC/CM from the beginning, so there will be very few changes. For agency-directed change orders in the study, they were surprised that there was such a high number. This was at a time when the owners were trying to take advantage of cost savings in a lot of cases, so they had to do it through a change order. As an example, a project was \$80 million, and they got good prices at \$74 million and wanted to do more work. However, not all change orders are disadvantages. It was not involving a designer until after the award. There are some constructive changes that come up after the award, but it doesn't perform as well and doesn't give the ability to be as nimble.

DBB is the worst-performing method for unforeseen conditions. Projects perform well working closely with designers and Design-Builders. There were very few errors and omissions for DB-BV in CM/GC.

The last study is the ACEC Research Institute DB Study. This involved looking not just from the owner's perspective but also the perspective of designers on how DB is impacting the design side of the equation. There were 155 firms that provided data on 105 projects; they interview top and bottom-performing projects to try to find causes behind correlations. Half of the work was done by DB. More than 80% of firms had growth in numbers of projects and volume of DB projects.

Part of the increase was because projects were performed right after the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act came out. They interviewed the top- and bottom-performing owners to find causes.

They examined the risk transfer. What they took away from the designer firms was that the projects were a tale of two extremes. On a scale from excellent to poor, 30% had a good experience with profitability and 30% had poor financial success. Half of folks on average were not satisfied with the DB process. In small projects, 65% had no claims disputes or arbitration. In small projects where there was balanced risk, there was good performance. The rates of claims, disputes and arbitrations/litigation were higher on large projects. In large projects, there was a lot less project harmony, a lot more change orders, and claims doubled. As projects grew, owners transferred more risk.

The study recommendations for owners were to look at the contract allocation and insurance findings. Split up the project when they get close to being over \$100 million (defined as a megaproject). A big takeaway is that where there is a unique need with a unique Design-Builder or groups that have a specialty, it's important to not have untrained staff on the DB project, avoid transferring unequitable risks, embrace the use of qualifications and best-value procurement, and be active members of the DB team. Owners should also engage in open forums around risk and insurance options and use qualifications in DB-BV procurement.

Even if the qualifications were there, the formula for best value does not allow anyone but the low bidder to win the contract. Statistically, they found in 65% of highway projects in a different study, there was no way for anyone but the lowest bidder to win the project. The use of qualifications would not have made a difference; the formula would not allow it. Contractors knew it was a low-bid project.

For DB teams, they found that encouraging long-term relationships was an indicator of success, similar to their findings in the CII study. It was surprising how many DB firms and designers did not do a risk analysis of the contract; they just chose the design without looking at the contract. Whereas, really knowing the contract, engaging early with owners to set up expectations, looking at the full insurance coverage and how many claims are going on. The results in the first two projects mask the lawsuits and claims going on between members.

He is launching a new 18-month study, ACEC DB 2.0 to look at Progressive DB and target pricing and qualifications-based selection which will be used as proxies for Progressive DB.

Arthur Antoine asked whether there were any updates on the quantitative data and tools and methods for selecting the appropriate project delivery method.

Keith said that he has not had a chance to add projects to the FHA website that was a synthesis of a lot of different project delivery selection tools; however, the website was less successful than expected and the FHA took it down. He has seen a lot of researchers trying to automate selection approaches. The key to success is having the decision-makers and experienced people who are working on the project discuss the key risks and key phases using tools or checklists. He hates to automate because there could be overriding factors. One city representative who would change the delivery method or one type of construction material or bridge design that would change the decision for the project. An automated approach that uses averages or a predictive model can miss human intuition and vocal context. Overriding factors are best treated through a risk analysis and discussion of the opportunities and challenges with the people who will build the project. That type of delivery selection process is the best.

Doug said his firm has an automated tool but it's just documentation for the future. He did a project selection process yesterday with Oklahoma DOT and it's the dialogue that is important. The tool they use doesn't turn factors into numbers. They avoid the situation in which, if one got a score of 59 and another got a 60, the 60 might not be a better fit than the 59. The inputs are qualitative.

Keith said structuring the discussion is important. With so many variables, it's important not to get wrapped around the axle. Once the group knows the risks, they should review the schedule, whether the market can handle the project, and whether the owner has capacity and training to do a new delivery method.

Arthur said he has seen project delivery become more and more collaborative. He liked giving the perspective of the owner's side and the self-performing or Design-Builder's side. He would like to know what they think of all the research being done on the qualitative contracting mechanisms, the collaboration during design development or even preconstruction.

Keith encouraged the TF members to download ACEC design report and read about the few key contractual issues that can cause heartburn. Some of them are in preconstruction. A lot are in insurance, decisions on insurance, and pass-downs.

Stuart said that, from the contractor's perspective all the recommendations they are making are right on. He agrees with their definition of cost certainty, but it's not what the group has been tasked to find. The Legislature has been looking at jobs that were initially estimated at, for example, \$100 million but came back as \$200 million. If Keith and Doug had to say DBB, DB, CM/GC, what is the range of contract type that is going to change the price of the job; is it a big range or like 5%?

Keith said that cost and time are so tied together, so it depends on several factors. If all three were finishing at the same time and having the same design in the end, one could say there is maybe more competition in DBB.

Doug said he does a lot of work in the field of cost certainty. The presentation tries to simplify a complex picture. The key question everyone wants to answer is "What is the chance the project will finish on budget and on time?" The work he's done deals with the point at which the team is able to lock in the scope. With CM/GC, it is easier to add to scope because there is a preconstruction period. With DB, regardless of how it is awarded, and with DBB, a change in scope must be done contractually. In Progressive DB, the owner comes in and, for example, expresses the need or desire to connect with the local community and add a water line. With CM/GC, it can be done; an agency simply has to get the price and the impact on schedule. With other methods, it's not as simple. His son did his PhD on CMR in vertical construction. He found that cost growth in many cases was not due to design errors, rather, it was due simply to added scope, when an original estimate is based on a scope that had since changed. He did a CM/GC project with Minnesota DOT that was \$100 million "over budget." The scope at project start was redecking eight bridges. At some point, the decision was made to replace the bridges. It wasn't scope creep but scope change and not the same project as it was initially. He has been working with them on a scope lock. That is where cost certainty measurements ought to be, is the point at which the scope is locked. Then the question is how to manage the project.

Keith worked on the Washington I-405 corridor project in the early 2000s as an advisory board member. He can't believe the Legislature is still giving WSDOT an impossible task. Fixing prices so early is impossible. He suggested that, if WSDOT has to commit to a cost, they should do a solid risk analysis through the Cost Estimate Validation Process (CEVP) and then use a GC/CM or Progressive DB to get to risk and give price with enough contingency and some flexible elements because they will have to build to whatever price they name. That's hard to do using DB and DB-BV. For WSDOT, he suggests strong contingency-based estimating, top down or bottom up. When WSDOT takes an estimate to the Legislature, they need to make sure the numbers have risk, contingency, and as much flexibility as possible built in. He also recommends contractor involvement as early as possible.

Doug said that it gets back to the quality of the DOT estimates, and everyone knows that the good estimators work for contractors. When he worked for a public DOT, he never got fired because his estimates were too low.

Keith observed that the Legislature is expecting cost estimates so early in planning phases when there hasn't been any preliminary engineering done. The CVEP process is basically the workshop where the agency brings in people who know the corridor or project and ask questions about whether there are sound walls, exploring the worst-case scenario for bridges, figuring out the cost of wetlands mitigation or railroad ROW issues. An agency can get in trouble by not relying on estimators—not to bloat the project but also not to miss the opportunity to document potential costs.

Santosh asked whether Keith and Doug had given any thought to project alliancing, in which the commercial interests of various project participants are probably better aligned and the closest thing to integrated project delivery is them. He wondered whether there is potential for alliancing to be a tool in the toolbox.

Doug said he was asked by the Georgia DOT to evaluate contract language and see whether alliance could be employed. He has worked in Australia and New Zealand on alliance projects. The big sticking point with alliance projects is the parties promise not to sue each other. There are a lot of really good things brought into the U.S., and parties can still sue at the end. Phil Barutha, at Notre Dame, looked at integrated project delivery on industrial projects. It is a good report even though it's not about highways, but water treatment plants and pharmaceutical factories.

Keith said that alliancing has been on international scans for FHA. He thinks that pilot projects to build capacity for owners and companies can get good results. It's hard to do that for projects at scale. Most have been in the UK under five-year alliance contracts. It takes a lot of political will; the DOT or a government office has to be behind it and defend why they are doing it.

Santosh noted that he had not heard anything on the topic of quality. He presumes quality is baked into all projects, but he would like to know whether they have any findings on project quality outcomes.

Doug mentioned that his company just finished a \$400 million tunnel project in Virginia for which his company was the quality oversight advisor. The problem with quality is understanding how design quality impacts construction quality. One finding from the Virginia project is that there is a huge gap in focus on design quality that needs to be researched. Construction quality is defined in the design phase. That is not just non-conformance reports but also staffing issues and risk-based quality management. Those kinds of things have to come out. When he and Keith did the first federal highway study one of the questions was about the impact of quality on DB versus DBB. They didn't find any impacts. The answer to Santosh's question is no.

Keith noted that the quality question is tough to answer in two minutes. The quality management approach has to be matched with the delivery system. And if an agency is using traditional methods in an alternative delivery approach, that can cause problems. He provided a study: [Guidebook on Alternative Quality Management Systems for Highway Construction | The National Academies Press](#) that addresses this.

Robynne noted that highway projects involve federal funding, so federal sources have to be on board, not just state political actors, with regard to alliancing. She thinks WSDOT projects may not allow for alliancing because most of their projects are funded by federal sources. She's seen alliancing with respect to quality. Design quality is an issue. People's perceptions are that projects are not being necessarily bid out. The Design-Builder is responsible for achieving performance requirements, so that is a contractual level at which they follow through on whether the quality management plan was set up correct is a higher standard than simply the warranty in DBB.

Jessica Murphy pointed out that the true measure of quality is the operations and maintenance (O&M) cost for an owner over time. She asked whether Keith or Doug were aware of any studies that compared sections of highway over time by delivery method.

Keith said he always wanted to do a study with a hard to tie to variables like the O&M cost Jessica mentioned. The closest he came was work he did on the Presidio Parkway where a DBB project was next to DB project that was a concession project. He may be able to find the report. He agrees with Jessica that the long-term costs measure the quality.

Co-Chair Zamzow thanked Keith and Doug for the presentation and their thoughts.

Robynne suggested that the TF establish a schedule for the remaining projects following the process they have used for all of the others.

Art McCluskey clarified that there are four remaining projects that are anticipated to advertise in December 2025 and beyond.

Thomas Brasch noted that he gave the presentation on the four remaining projects during the August 21 meeting. Talia Baker noted that the presentation is posted on the TF webpage.

Co-Chair Zamzow encouraged TF members to re-review the presentation.

Co-Chair Riley-Hall suggested that the agenda for the next meeting include a quick refresher presentation on the four remaining projects followed by a discussion. WSDOT could batch the projects two at a time if there are two that are similar. Then the TF members can discuss the projects.

Art McCluskey said that WSDOT will prepare the refresher presentation.

Co-Chair Riley-Hall suggested that part of the next meeting also include a conversation about the key themes they heard in the presentation today.

Art asked whether the TF had heard anything from CPARB about the interim report.

Co-Chair Riley-Hall said that there have been a couple of minor tweaks to the final version of the report, and it has not yet been sent to the Legislature.

Talia added that the only tweaks were correcting the dates and making sure the right RCWs were referenced. This week she is editing and putting together a letter for Co-Chair Riley-Hall to sign and get CPARB signatures. These tasks can happen early next week.

Co-Chair Riley-Hall noted that she had sent an email to TF members with the requested WSDOT cost data. The TF should go over that at some point in the future.

Art added that the cost data includes all 900 projects between 2017 and 2024 separated by year. Someone could do a “what if” scenario, for example, take out the two large anomalous projects. WSDOT provided all of the information that was available.

Talia said she will try to post the WSDOT cost data—the file is very big.

Stuart suggested that the agenda show that they will be refreshing themselves on the four remaining projects for 5–10 minutes, then having the discussion.

Next Meeting Agenda

The agenda for the October 2 meeting will include the following:

- Review and approve notes from the September 18 meeting.
- Get a schedule for the remaining projects. Start going through them. Follow the process.
- Discuss the Molenaar/Gransberg presentation key takeaways.
- Discuss the WSDOT project cost data.

Co-Chair Linneth Riley-Hall moved to adjourn the meeting; Jessica Murphy seconded the motion. The motion was approved by a unanimous voice vote. Co-Chair Zamzow adjourned the meeting.

The meeting was adjourned at 4:33 p.m.

Next meeting: October 2, 2024, 3:00 p.m.

Action Items

1. Talia Baker will finalize the letter for the interim report, obtain needed signatures, and send the letter with the report to the Legislature.
2. Talia Baker will post the WSDOT project cost data on the TF web page.
3. TF members will re-review the WSDOT presentation on the four remaining North Spokane Corridor projects.

Resources

- [WSDOT Project Delivery Method Review Task Force Homepage](#)
- RCWs [47.20.780](#) and [47.20.785](#)
- RCWs [39.10.300](#) and [39.10.340](#)
- [GCCM Certification Application](#)
- [WSDOT Cost Estimating Manual for Projects](#)
- [Design-Build Manual | Manuals | WSDOT \(wa.gov\)](#)
- [Guidebook on Alternative Quality Management Systems for Highway Construction | The National Academies Press](#)